Objective: Recent natural disasters have highlighted shortfall areas in current hospital disaster preparedness. These include the following: 1) insufficient coordination between hospitals and civil/ governmental response agencies; 2) insufficient on-site critical care capability; 3) a lack of "portability" of acute care processes (i.e., patient transport and/or bringing care to the patient); 4) education shortfalls; and 5) the inability of hospitals to align disaster medical requirements with other competing priorities.
disaster necessitating medical response is a low-probability but high-consequence threat for individual communities, hospitals, and medical professionals (1) . In today's constrained environment, the highest priority of hospitals is to allocate limited discretionary authority at the fulcrum of greatest need and fiscal sustainability. Historically, medical disaster response has not competed effectively with other more-pressing and visible needs within the hospital. A pattern has emerged where communities and hospitals that experience disasters subsequently devote "real" energy and resources to these requirements. For the majority of communities and facilities that have not experienced the consequences of a disaster, their involvement with preparedness is often limited to disaster-response planning as mandated by compliance agencies such as the Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Conducting substantive and comprehensive disaster response "exercises" is not common because of their inherent costs and time requirements.
The impediments to advancing hospital disaster response are not simply budgetary. When community, regional, and national preparedness is viewed from the macro level, true medical response is often not a primary focus of elected government and civic officials. Necessary resources are directed toward the incident site and its first responders, in order to best ensure overall public welfare. To a significant extent in the United States, detailed disaster-response planning by communities stops at the entry point into the hospital, the Emergency Department. Figure 1 illustrates one of the primary reasons for this dilemma, the interface between the wholly different cultures of public and private entities. All of this ultimately leads to what has been previously termed "ambulances to nowhere" (2) .
Given these complexities, no one has really put forward a rational solution set that is broadly applicable for hospitals. What is clear is that following each prominent global or regional disaster event, a flurry of interest ensues, and then hospitals attempt to respond in the short-term to widespread calls for increased readiness. These demands for "do something now" solutions are expensive and usually do not offer a long-lasting impact on the overall readiness posture for hospitals. Fairly quickly, concern fades from the collective consciousness of the public (3).
Finally and most recently, Hurricane Katrina underscored our need to plan for circumstances where medical infrastructure is either destroyed or rendered unusable. The New Orleans metropolitan area lost much of its hospital-based response capabilities during the disaster and for the foreseeable postdisaster future. Therefore, not only must hospitals effectively plan how they will participate and meaningfully contribute during a disaster, but also many communities must plan for circumstances in which some or all of the hospitals in their response network become unusable. When we further consider those patients with chronic critical illnesses, we see that the loss of infrastructure impacts not only disasterrelated casualties but also those who require access to frequent acute care interventions. Finally, consider that it is probable that a regional or greater outbreak of emerging infectious disease would have a similar if not worse overall impact than Hurricane Katrina.
It seems that as long as we must make competitive choices between all of these needs, rather than identifying solutions that share common elements with other hospital problems demanding attention, then disaster medical response will largely remain a secondtier priority and an unfunded mandate. Furthermore, it is equally clear that sufficiency of medical planning and education of healthcare professionals before a disaster must become a more tangible national priority.
FRAMING THE ISSUES
The definition of "large-scale disaster" or "mass-casualty scenario" is variable (4). Today, many or most of our tertiary hospitals function at or near maximal system capacity every day. How many unplanned and unscheduled critically ill or injured patients who require mechanical ventilation does it take to overwhelm a system that is already operating near capacity? Is it ten or is it a thousand patients? In either circumstance, the point is self-evident. Therefore, during the planning phases for a large-scale disaster, hospital medical response leaders should acknowledge the following probable realities.
1. Critical care capabilities will require significant expansion. 2. Meeting these demands also means that healthcare professionals who normally do not provide critical care will be expected to do so. 3. To provide this care, adequate availability of sophisticated medical devices as well as access to all necessary supplies must be thoroughly preplanned, because it will not materialize in the midst of a disaster when other hospitals are making the same requests or pleas. 4. Space to provide critical care beyond the intensive care unit (ICU) has not been identified by most hospitals. 5. Education of healthcare professionals who will provide disaster care is currently inadequate in many or most hospitals, falling short in disasterspecific content as well as pertinent critical care clinical topics for noncritical care personnel. 6. Protection of healthcare professionals (e.g., think severe acute respiratory syndrome [SARS]) is an immutable requirement, including bona fide education, training, and surveillance programs regarding isolation and the proper use of personal protective equipment (5 , 7). Today, each team carries three volumecycled transport ventilators (with internal compressors), three physiologic monitors that include hemodynamic and capnography capabilities; three multichannel infusion pumps for intravenous fluids, blood, or enteral feedings; and a point-of-care laboratory device ( Fig. 3 ). Some teams are also equipped with a battery-operated bronchoscope with an internal light source, and a portable ultrasound device that displays images on a laptop computer. Teams carry a predetermined formulary and supplies for the complete and adequate support of both medical and postsurgical patients.
This same modular approach to critical care is potentially well-suited for disaster medical response. It is scalable, it is mobile, and it has capabilities that can be quantitated and proportionately applied to a casualty stream after a civil disaster. Not only could "portable" critical care teams support ICU patients beyond the hospital, but they could also be used in an existing hospital to increase ICU and ventilator support capabilities.
Disaster response agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) manage and direct programs that train, equip, and deploy disaster response teams to the incident site and locale. Examples include Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) and Disaster Mortuary Teams (DMORT). Given recent events and their clinical care requirements as outlined above, we believe that it is appropriate to consider the development of national Disaster Critical Care Teams (DCRITs). These critical care teams should have the following capabilities:
1. be rapidly deployable (on-site within 12-24 hrs); 2. provide "self-contained," comprehensive critical care capabilities for medical and postsurgical patients; 3. be able to care for acute disorders or the decompensation of predetermined chronic medical conditions (chronic critical illness); and 4. be fully functional in a hospital, in an austere prehospital setting, or in an aircraft.
These teams could be drawn from voluntary personnel resources who work in critical care units every day across the United States. Participants should be well-practiced with all deployable medical devices, including mechanical ventilators. This includes the machines currently packaged as a component of the National Strategic Stockpile, the Impact Eagle 754 and the Puritan-Bennett LP-10. As with other NDMS teams, these teams should practice and train together for a wide variety of scenarios.
The CCATT model is built around a utilitarian team approach. The teams consist of an "intensivist" with formal critical care fellowship training or a physician with significant critical care background (e.g., an emergency medicine specialist), a critical care nurse, and a respiratory therapist. The role of the respiratory therapist deserves special emphasis. Respiratory therapists carry with them the tools and fittings to bridge medical gas circuits that other care providers cannot seem to connect. Conversely, they are also adept at solving problems quickly when the "plumbing" is connected but doesn't function as it should.
To summarize this section, "portable" critical care, or DCRIT, has become a timely topic for discussion. Given the recent disaster events that destroyed hospitals, as well as the fact that many or most hospitals do not have sufficient disaster critical care capabilities, the development of these teams by national disasterresponse agencies would significantly augment overall response capabilities, to the benefit of our citizenry.
Hospitals and Disaster Response
The Role of a Hospital During a Disaster. During the period immediately following a large casualty-generating disaster, the hospital predominantly evolves to become an expanded critical care unit (8) . Patients are triaged and lifesaving care is rendered, beginning at the "front door." Those patients who require it undergo immediate surgery. However, a significant proportion of both surgical and nonsurgical casualty flow ultimately goes to a defined critical care area. This remains true whether the disaster is a trauma casualty-producing event or due to a life-threatening emerging infectious disease. The notable difference is that critical care requirements are more likely to be ongoing for a serious infectious disease outbreak. In either circumstance, hospital personnel and materiel requirements and demands increase geometrically.
Traditionally, we designate a geographic space (the ICU) for "all" critically ill patients. However, there is a growingevery-day realization that the ICU does not circumscribe all of the critically ill patients found in the hospital. For a variety of rationales, these critically ill patients receive sophisticated and advanced modalities of care outside of a usual ICU setting, and often without the benefit of advanced physiologic and other monitoring that is routinely available in the ICU. Much discussion is ongoing about these "indirect" intensive care units: who are the patients, what is the level of training of their care-providers, is care optimized, and are some/many of these patients at preventable risk for deterioration because the monitoring and care standards are not aligned with their physiologic needs?
Because of these concerns, we are witnessing the rapid development and emergence of medical emergency teams or rapid-response teams within the hospital. These teams are intended to monitor inpatients and intervene before physiologic deterioration supervenes. One might ask, in the event of a medical disaster, could these teams be repurposed for sophisticated casualty care and ICU expansion? We think it is logical that these types of critical care "outreach" teams, in conjunction with non-critical-care hospital personnel, could be leveraged as an effective strategy to extend ICU capabilities during a disaster.
Education of Hospital Personnel in Disaster Management. Many available disaster medicine training programs are directed toward the prehospital phases of care and are focused almost exclusively on triage, decontamination, patient evacuation, communications, and other firstresponder topics. Many of these courses are of excellent quality. In particular, the National Disaster Life Support Foundation (NDLSF), in conjunction with the American Medical Association (AMA), is leading the way with the development of a tiered, standardized curriculum for all healthcare professionals in the United States (9). These programs are well on their way to becoming the national training platform for disaster medical education.
In 2002, the Society of Critical Care Medicine (SCCM) established a program called Fundamentals of Disaster Management (FDM) for its membership. This two-day course is designed for critical care professionals and covers all pertinent disaster medicine topics according to their needs. The course takes a nutsand-bolts approach to disaster medicine education. It is designed to be taught either alone or in conjunction with Fundamental Critical Care Support (FCCS), as dictated by the needs of the institution and/or the learner group. This is a mature program with a second-edition companion textbook/handbook.
In addition, the SCCM is currently developing a standardized and highly concentrated course (Hospital Mass-Casualty Disaster Management [HDM]) in order to equip hospital-based healthcare professionals with basic and essential disaster medical knowledge (10) . What distinguishes this course from other offerings is the inclusion of clinical topics. This course incorporates critical care topics appropriate for hospital personnel who are not normally involved in ICU-level patient care, including respiratory failure and ventilator management, recognition and treatment of shock, sedation and pain management, and physiologic monitoring. The SCCM is actively solidifying a partnership with the NDLSF and the AMA to incorporate the HDM course into its family of national training programs.
Standard of Care Versus Sufficiency of Care. A primary differentiation between everyday hospital operations and those during a disaster may be the requirement to decrement the level of care provided. This philosophical tenet involves attempting to accomplish the most good for the greatest number of casualties while acknowledging limitations in available resources (personnel and medical materiel). This is particularly true for critical care.
Simply stated, there is no single universally applied set of care standards. For individual facilities, a rational approach is to predefine what care (and what quantity of care) would be provided on the basis of a "grid" of the number of casualties vs. level of acuity, indexed to community hospital bed availability. Clearly, this is not an absolute guideline, because demand for resources and resource availability are dynamic processes that change over time. Nevertheless, this type of exercise focuses a medical community and can imbue leaders with the decisionmaking mindset that may be necessary during a large-scale disaster.
Partnering Disaster Medical Programs with Other Hospital Programs. Ensuring (and documenting) patient safety in the hospital is an essential but resource-consuming activity. Furthermore, the demand for enhanced patient safety in our hospitals is accelerating. This is especially true as we move beyond compliance activities into multidisciplinary, tiered accident and error prevention. From this perspective, a medical catastrophe can be on any scale, involving a single patient who receives an improper medication or mass-casualty circumstances. Although these events are fundamentally different in scope, magnitude, and cause, they share at their core a need for accurate and complete planning and education to prevent or mitigate their consequences. Is there sufficient overlap to merge some of the planning, education, and practice of hospital patient safety and disaster medical response? Patient safety infrastructure could potentially be used in hospital-based disaster preparatory efforts for the following purposes:
